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AWAKING RIP VAN WINKLE:  HAS THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
REACHED A TURNING POINT?
William R. Corbett*
“Today’s decision confirms that the NLRB has become the ‘Rip Van Winkle of
administrative agencies.’”1
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that in 1945 Rip Van Winkle,2 a man with a keen interest in labor
law,3 had taken a few drinks of liquor from the flagon as he was reading the
much-anticipated opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Republic Avia-
tion Corp. v. NLRB.4  Suppose further that the combination of the liquor and
* William R. Corbett, Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University.  I thank Dean Douglas E. Ray and Professors Jeffrey M. Hirsch
and Alex Long for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Liebman & Walsh,
Members, dissenting in part) (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir.
1992)).
2 WASHINGTON IRVING, Rip Van Winkle:  A Posthumous Writing of Diedrich Knicker-
bocker, in THE SKETCH BOOK OF GEOFFREY CRAYON, GENT. 32 (The Heritage Press 1939)
(1819).
3 Although this variation may seem to take great liberties with Mr. Irving’s story and char-
acter, it is not so.  Irving did comment on Rip Van Winkle and labor:  he had “an insuperable
aversion to all kinds of profitable labor.” Id. at 35.  I think, then, that one who has an
aversion to labor may take an interest in the laws that protect those who must engage in
labor.
4 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).  The importance of Republic
Aviation will be explained more fully below.  In Republic Aviation, the Supreme Court
adopted presumptions regarding the circumstances under which an employer’s maintenance
of rules prohibiting employees from soliciting their coemployees to support a union consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 803.
The Court approved two presumptions developed by the National Labor Relations Board
(“Board”):  1) a rule prohibiting solicitations during working hours is presumed to be valid,
id. at 803 n.10; and 2) a rule prohibiting solicitations outside working hours is presumed to
be an unfair labor practice, id. at 803.  Since Republic Aviation, there have been many
Supreme Court and Board cases on employees and others (including union organizers) using
person-to-person solicitation, distribution of literature, and other means of communicating
messages to employees at the workplace. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527
(1992) (interpreting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) and addressing
the limited exception to the rule that employers may deny access to employer property to
nonemployee union organizers); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (address-
ing solicitation by employees in areas open to the public in a health care facility); NLRB v.
Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (discussing union’s inability to waive the normally
applicable solicitation and distribution rights of employees); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (addressing nonemployee union organizers’ access to property);
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the soporific words of the Court left Rip in a state of deep slumber.  He awakes
in 2008, and realizing as he looks around him that he has been asleep for more
than one night, begins to wonder about the changed condition of organized
labor and collective bargaining in the United States.5  Assuming the legendary
sleeper gets a job6 and is trained in computer use, he could research the matter
on the Internet and perhaps send e-mail to experts who could update him,
although he would be well advised not to send such e-mails from his
employer’s computer or on its e-mail system.  I wonder whether Rip would be
amazed at what had transpired in labor law during his sixty-plus years of slum-
ber.  If Rip told someone that the last thing he had read before his nap was
Republic Aviation, that consultant might suggest that he begin his update by
reading the 2007 decision of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or
“the Board”) in The Guard Publishing Co. d/b/a The Register-Guard.7  What
would Rip think if he read that decision?
What our legendary sleeper would find if he had slumbered for sixty-plus
years is that “traditional” labor law in the United States is a relatively minor
part of labor and employment law in 2009.  Congress passed the Wagner Act in
1935,8 establishing a model of collective bargaining between employers and
representatives selected by employees.9  Since the 1950s, union density in the
nation has been declining,10 and the decline accelerated in the 1970s.11  The
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962) (sustaining a rule prohibiting distribu-
tion of literature in work areas).
5 Washington Irving’s Rip Van Winkle slept only twenty years, but I will need my character
to sleep more than sixty years from ten years after the passage of the Wagner Act until the
present. See IRVING, supra note 2, at 48.
6 Here I deviate from Mr. Irving’s story again. Id. at 50.
7 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007).
8 The current National Labor Relations Act is the Wagner Act, as amended by chapter 120
of the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, and the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.  It is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(2006).
9 Senator Wagner’s legislative assistant and the principal draftsman of the statute, Leon
Keyserling, said, “‘[I]t was our view that the greatest contribution to greater equity and the
distribution of the product between wages and profit would come, not through the definition
of terms by government, but by the process of collective bargaining with labor placed in a
position nearer to equality.’”  Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Work-
place:  A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1683
(1989) (quoting Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen:  An Interview with Leon
Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 319 (1987)); see also
Casebeer, supra, at 362 (“[T]he Wagner Act was in some ways a very conservative statute,
because it says that there are a lot of things that the government ought not to decide.  We
should permit business and labor to decide them.”).
10 The percentage of employees in the United States represented by unions has declined
from a peak in the early 1950s of approximately 36% of the workforce. Right-to-Work
Advocates Mark Labor Day with Calls for Repeal of National Labor Law, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 170, at A-11 (Sept. 2, 2005).  The current level is about 12.1% of the overall
workforce and 7.5% of the private workforce.  Michelle Amber, BLS Reports 12.1 Percent
Unionization Rate in 2007; Unions Added 331,100 Members, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
17, at AA-1 (Jan. 28, 2008).  In 1983, the first year for which the Bureau of Labor Statistics
has comparable data, the level of union membership was 20.1%.  John Sullivan, Union Mem-
bership Rate Dropped in 2004 to 12.5 Percent, Continuing 20-Year Decline, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 18, at AA-1 (Jan. 28, 2005).
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rights of employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)12
have been eroded by decisions of the courts and the NLRB.  Indeed, the organ-
ized labor/collective bargaining regime has become moribund, and Congress
has not passed legislation to reinvigorate it.  Instead, beginning in the 1960s,
Congress turned to individual minimum rights laws as a means of protecting
employees and has continued on that path.13  If Rip Van Winkle awoke in
2008, he would no doubt find that the dream of Senator Wagner and others in
the early and middle part of the twentieth century has not been realized and is
on the brink of dying in the early part of the twenty-first century.
He also would realize that, among many bad years, 2007 was a remarkably
bleak year for organized labor, collective bargaining, and the NLRA.  On the
legislative front, Congress considered the Employee Free Choice Act
(“EFCA”),14 which organized labor designated as its top legislative priority.15
The Act would mandate Board certification of unions based on card check
majorities without resort to Board-conducted elections.16  In addition, it would
institute mediation and eventually binding arbitration to achieve first collective
bargaining agreements if the parties cannot reach agreement in specified peri-
ods of time.17  Finally, the EFCA would strengthen enforcement by increasing
the remedies available for the unfair labor practices of discharging or discrimi-
11 Paul Berks, Social Change and Judicial Response:  The Handbook Exception to Employ-
ment-At-Will, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 231, 234-35 (2000) (“[U]nprecedented decline in
union density and influence at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s effectively
eliminated collective bargaining as a genuine alternative to the at-will regime.”); Jeffrey M.
Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet:  Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262,
267 n.21 (2008) (noting decline in private sector union density from 21.7% in 1977 to 7.4%
in 2006).
12 The key provision of the NLRA setting forth the rights of employees is section 7.  29
U.S.C. § 157 (2006).  It articulates the rights to self-organize, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to choose representatives for collective bargaining, to engage in concerted
activity for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from exer-
cising the foregoing rights. Id.
13 James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1563, 1571 (1996) (“At some point during this legislative barrage, it became clear that
Congress viewed government regulation founded on individual employee rights, rather than
collective bargaining between private entities, as the primary mechanism for ordering
employment relations and redistributing economic resources.”); Reuel E. Schiller, From
Group Rights to Individual Liberties:  Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of
Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 73 (1999) (“Since the 1960s, the labor
movement has suffered from American liberalism’s rejection of the group basis of its own
past and its inability to find a place for group rights within the model of individual rights it
clings to so dearly.”).
14 Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (as passed by House of Rep-
resentatives, Mar. 1, 2007).  The Employee Free Choice of 2009 was introduced in the 111th
Congress. See H.R.1409, 111th Cong. (as introduced in the House of Representatives on
Mar. 10, 2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate on Mar. 10, 2009).
15 Michael Bologna, AFL-CIO Organizing Director Says Unions Will Press Fight for
Employee Free Choice Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at A-10 (Sept. 26, 2007); Susan
J. McGolrick, AFL-CIO Official Calls Card-Check Bill “Most Important” Labor Law Since
1935, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 80, at A-12 (Apr. 26, 2007).
16 H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2008); see also H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009), and S. 560,
111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
17 See H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
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nating against employees during a union organizing campaign or during the
period leading to a first contract and prioritizing such cases and bolstering the
Board’s power to seek injunctions in such cases.18  Under current law, employ-
ers may reject a union demand for recognition based on a showing of majority
status and force the filing of a petition for an election.19  Overstating the impor-
tance of this proposed legislation would be difficult.  Many unions have aban-
doned attempts to use the mechanism of NLRB secret ballot elections to be
certified as collective bargaining representatives of employees.20  The win rates
in such elections have been consistently low, owing in large part to strong cam-
paigns by employers, sometimes laced with unfair labor practices, between the
filing of the petition and conducting the election.21  Although the House of
Representatives passed the bill in 2007, it did not reach the Senate floor, falling
nine votes short of the sixty needed to invoke cloture.22  Not only did Congress
not pass legislation to help unions gain recognition, but in 2007 the NLRB
modified the recognition-bar doctrine, thereby facilitating the ouster of unions
that have been voluntarily recognized.  In Dana Corp., the Board modified its
recognition-bar doctrine, to now provide for a forty-five day period from notice
of recognition during which a rival union or decertification petition can be
filed.23  The decisions of the NLRB, the agency charged with interpretation and
enforcement of the NLRA, have been so bad for unions and employees over
such a long period that in October 2007, the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) filed a complaint with the
International Labour Organization’s Committee on Freedom of Association
(“ILO”) alleging that a long string of decisions by the NLRB constituted viola-
tions of two fundamental ILO conventions on freedom of association.24  That
complaint cited a series of Board decisions during President Bush’s two terms
that “signal a retreat from the promises of the NLRA and a deepening crisis for
American labor law and practice.”25
Finally, in 2007, the Board issued one of its most eagerly and long-
awaited decisions in The Guard Publishing Co. d/b/a The Register-Guard.26
The decision was expected to address a number of issues regarding application
of the NLRA to use of e-mail and the Internet.  Although the decision did not
address the full range of issues the Board suggested it might, the Board’s deci-
sion that employees do not have a right to use the employer’s e-mail system for
18 See H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
19 See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 308-10 (1974).
20 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 11, at 264.
21 Complaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association by the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations Concerning the United States Govern-
ment’s Violations of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining by Failing to
Enforce the National Labor Relations Act at 10-41, ILO Case No. 2608 (Oct. 25, 2007),
available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/mamr-78btn4/$File/ILOcomplaint.pdf [herein-
after Complaint].
22 See Derrick Cain, Kennedy Says Employee Free Choice Act Must Wait for Passage Until
After Election, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at A-11 (Feb. 7, 2008).
23 Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 434 (2007).
24 See Complaint, supra note 21, at 1.
25 Id.
26 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007).
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section 7 purposes27 and the Board’s revision of its standard for discriminatory
enforcement of rules28 were significant setbacks for employees and organized
labor.  The decision also constitutes one of the most significant and far-reach-
ing restrictions of section 7 rights in the Board’s recent narrowing of the
NLRA.  One awaking in 2008 would find that recent decades have not been
kind to collective bargaining and the NLRA regime, and that 2007 was a partic-
ularly bad year.
Historical perspective can, of course, change over time.  What if Rip Van
Winkle does not wake in 2008, but slumbers on and does not awake until 2013
or 2020?  What would he discover about the state of labor law then?  From that
perspective, as bad as 2007 may seem for the NLRA regime, we may look back
at some point in the future and realize that it was a turning point, or that the
proverbial pendulum had reached the highest point and was about to swing
back in the other direction.  At the end of 2007, the appointments of three
Board members expired, two of those being Republicans.29  Although President
Bush sent three nominations to the Senate in January 2008, confirmation was
dead on arrival,30 and the Board was down to two members.  In December
2007, in anticipation of the Board’s having only two members in January 2008,
the then four-member Board delegated its powers to three members.31  The
Board took the position that with the delegation of power to three, a two-mem-
ber quorum could issue decisions.32  However, the legitimacy of the delegation
was questionable.  Regardless of whether two-member Board decisions are
legitimate, the Board did not render decisions that made dramatic changes in
labor law in 2008.  Although the Board issued 328 decisions in fiscal year
2008, the two members could not reach a decision in approximately one-fifth to
one-quarter of the new cases, and also did not decide many major cases that
had been pending for years.33
In the wake of 2007, there are some prospects for success for organized
labor.  The EFCA lay dormant in Congress in 2008, but not dead.34  In 2007,
organized labor initiated efforts to have the NLRB issue a rule recognizing the
right of employees to engage in minority-union bargaining.35  Thus, inchoate
27 Id. at 1110.
28 Id.
29 The Board consists of five members appointed by the President with advice and consent
of the Senate for staggered five-year terms.  29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2008).  By custom and
practice, three members are of the same political party as the President, and two are of the
other party.  Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board:  The Transformation of the
NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1372 n.41 (2000).
30 See President Renominates Battista, Walsh, Nominates Morales to Fill Board Vacancies,
Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) No. 5, at 138 (Jan. 31, 2008).
31 Susan J. McGolrick, Board Temporarily Delegates Authority in Anticipation of Having
Only Two Members, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 249, at A-1 (Dec. 31, 2007).
32 Id.; Marcia Coyle, Vacancies Threaten to Paralyze the NLRB, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 4, 2008,
at 1.
33 Susan J. McGolrick, Board Issued 328 Decisions in FY 2008, Lowered Inventory, Despite
Three Vacancies, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at A-10 (Oct. 28, 2008).
34 See Cain, supra note 22, at A-11.
35 See Steven Greenhouse, Seven Unions Ask Labor Board to Order Employers to Bargain,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at A14; Change to Win Joins Other Unions Seeking Rule on
Minority-Union Bargaining, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at A-1 (Jan. 8, 2008).  Currently,
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efforts to reform the NLRA in ways that promote the collective bargaining
regime remain alive and may come to fruition.  The election of President
Obama and the Democratic gains in Congress in the 2008 election enhanced the
prospects for law reform favorable to organized labor and collective bargain-
ing.  For example, supporters of the EFCA became optimistic regarding the
likelihood of enacting the proposed law, and bills were introduced in both
houses in March 2009.36  Moreover, former Board Chairman William Gould
urged then-President-Elect Obama to initiate a number of reforms to the NLRB
and the NLRA.37
Still, for the NLRA to become a revitalized part of labor and employment
law in the United States, the Board’s decision in Register-Guard needs to be
overturned.  Professor Jeffrey Hirsch suggests that how the NLRB deals with
the Internet could save or destroy the NLRA.38  Although that is a far-reaching
statement, it may not be hyperbolic.  The importance of the Register-Guard
decision is not based on just the pervasiveness and importance of the Internet
and related technology; the case required the Board to consider its rules regard-
ing employee communication and its rules and views regarding the balancing
of employer property interests against employee rights under section 7 of the
NLRA.  The Board’s decision elevated employers’ property interests over
employees’ rights, and interpreted the NLRA in a restrictive way that threatens
to make it irrelevant and obsolescent.  Correspondingly, the Board passed up an
opportunity to begin interpreting the NLRA in a way that could make it an
important part of the whole of United States labor and employment law.  Part I
of this Article discusses the Board’s narrowing of the NLRA through its deci-
sions from the expansive interpretation in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast
Ohio in 2000 to the restrictive interpretation in Register-Guard in 2007.  Part II
considers the importance of NLRA protection of employee Internet and e-mail
use and discusses the Register-Guard decision.  Part III considers the implica-
tions of Register-Guard for section 7 rights of union and nonunion employees.
the NLRA is interpreted as permitting unions to represent employees only when a majority
of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit supports the union.
36 See, e.g., Susan R. Hobbs, Change to Win Aims for Passage of EFCA, Health Care
Legislation in First 100 Days, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 216, at AA-1 (Nov. 7, 2008).
The EFCA was reintroduced in the 111th Congress in March 2009. See H.R. 1409, 111th
Cong. (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
37 See Former NLRB Chairman Urges Reform of Board, NLRA in New Administration,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 212, at A-8 (Nov. 3, 2008).
38 Hirsch, supra note 11, at 264.
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I. SLOUCHING TOWARD REGISTER-GUARD:  2000 TO 200739
A. Expansive Interpretation and Hope
In 2000, the Board in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio40 changed
the state of Board law and held that the Weingarten41 right to be represented at
an investigatory interview extends to workers not represented by a union.42
Although one could question how often nonunion workers would either know
about or use this right, the Board decision seemed to me significant because it
enlarged the applicability of the NLRA to nonunion workers.  In an earlier
work, I proclaimed the importance of the decision and argued that the NLRA
could become an important source of rights and protections for nonunion work-
ers, and that the NLRA needed to fill a void left by other United States employ-
ment law.43  I argued that the NLRA would be useful in protecting nonunion
employees in the following areas, among others:  expression and technology,
rules established by employers, and employees’ speaking out against
employers.44
Regarding expression and technology, I stated that the NLRA is “about
communication and expression,” and “[c]omputers, e-mail, and the Internet
make the NLRA more relevant in the twenty-first century than at any time
since its passage.”45  Although there was reason to believe that this statement
was accurate at the time, the Board’s decisions since then repeatedly have frus-
trated rather than bolstered that hope.  Among those decisions, I think that Reg-
ister-Guard is the decision that marks the nadir.
The Board’s decision in Timekeeping Systems, Inc.46 was the exemplar I
used in a prior article to show how the NLRA protects nonunion employees’
expression and use of technology.  The case involved an employee who pro-
tested his boss’ proposal regarding a new vacation policy.47  The boss sent the
proposal out to employees via e-mail and indicated that comments were wel-
come.48  The employee responded by e-mail to the boss and all other employ-
ees, criticizing the proposal and demonstrating that the supervisor was wrong in
his calculations.49  The angry boss gave the employee the option of submitting
an acceptable apology or being fired.50  He was fired.51  The Board adopted the
39 In this section I refer to and quote from two articles that I wrote.  Despite the immodesty
of doing that, this Article continues my work in those articles—tracing the Board’s progress
from expansive to restrictive interpretations of NLRA section 7 rights.
40 Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), enforced in part and rev’d in
part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
41 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
42 Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. at 679.
43 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century:  Everything
Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 306 (2002).
44 Id. at 287-96.
45 Id. at 287.
46 Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997).
47 Id. at 246.
48 Id. at 245-46.
49 Id. at 246.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 247.
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decision of the administrative law judge, concluding that the employee’s con-
duct was a concerted activity for mutual aid or protection under section 7 of the
NLRA, and firing him was an unfair labor practice.52  I will discuss later what
effect the Board’s decision in Register-Guard may have on Timekeeping
Systems.53
The second area in which I hoped for broadened NLRA interpretation was
Board findings of unfair labor practices where employers promulgated and
maintained rules that could restrict protected conduct.  Among the decisions
illustrating section 7 protection were employer rules that prohibited discussion
of wages,54 that prohibited employees from criticizing employers or their
approaches to workplace issues,55 and that prohibited employees from using
abusive or threatening language.56
The third area involved employees speaking out against their employers.57
For example, an employee who gave an interview to a magazine in which he
was critical of his employer engaged in section 7 conduct, and the employer
committed an unfair labor practice by issuing a disciplinary warning letter to
the employee.58
My hope for expansive interpretation of the NLRA that would make the
Act relevant and useful in the nonunion sector was short-lived.
B. Restrictive Interpretations and Diminishing Hope
In 2004, the Board reversed its Epilepsy Foundation ruling, holding in
IBM Corp.59 that the Weingarten right to representation does not extend to
nonunion workers.60  Although the Board has changed its collective mind on
that issue several times, the time between Epilepsy Foundation and IBM Corp.
was a very short period of time for a reversal.  It was not IBM Corp. alone,
however, that moved me from optimism to pessimism after Epilepsy Founda-
tion.  Two other Board decisions in 2004 continued narrowing the expansive
coverage that I thought was possible.  In Holling Press, Inc.,61 the Board held
that section 7 did not cover the conduct of an employee who tried to persuade
co-employees to testify in support of her in her sexual harassment case.62  As
troubling was Lutheran Heritage-Village-Livonia Home, Inc.,63 in which the
52 Id. at 250.
53 See infra notes 205-14.
54 Corbett, supra note 43, at 293 (discussing NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d
531, 543 (6th Cir. 2000), enforcing 327 N.L.R.B. 522 (1999)).
55 Id. (discussing Lockheed Martin Astronautics, 330 N.L.R.B. 422 (2000)).
56 Id. at 294 (discussing Adtranz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 291
(2000), enforcement denied, 253 F.3d 19, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
57 Id. at 295-96 (discussing Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos., 333 N.L.R.B. 850 (2001);
Allstate Ins. Co., 332 N.L.R.B. 759 (2000); Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 332 N.L.R.B.
1536 (2000)).
58 Corbett, supra note 43, at 296 (discussing Allstate, 332 N.L.R.B. 759).
59 IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1289 (2004).
60 See William R. Corbett, The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act:  Maintain-
ing Workplace Decorum and Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 30
(2006).
61 Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 301 (2004).
62 Id. at 301.
63 Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage), 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2004).
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Board held that an employer’s maintenance of rules prohibiting “abusive and
profane language,” “harassment,” and “verbal, mental and physical abuse” did
not violate section 7.64  Prior to Lutheran Heritage, the Board had stated the
standard in Lafayette Park Hotel65 for determining whether maintenance of
workplace rules violates section 8(a)(1):
[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether the rules would reasonably tend to chill employ-
ees in the exercise of their [s]ection 7 rights.  Where the rules are likely to have a
chilling effect on [s]ection 7 rights, the Board may conclude that their maintenance is
an unfair labor practice, even absent evidence of enforcement.66
In a 2007 decision, the Board explained the Lutheran Heritage modifica-
tion of the Lafayette Park standard:
Under this standard, the first inquiry is “whether the rule explicitly restricts activities
protected by [s]ection 7.”  If so, the rule is unlawful; if not the violation is dependent
upon a showing of one of the following:  (1) employees would reasonably construe
the language to prohibit [s]ection 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response
to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of [s]ection 7
rights.67
As will be discussed below, the Lutheran Heritage modification of the
rules standard may interact with the Register-Guard decision in ways that sig-
nificantly restrict employees’ ability to express themselves in the workplace.68
Thus, in a series of decisions, the NLRB began interpreting section 7
restrictively to remove protections that appeared promising only a few years
before.  These restrictive interpretations began closing down what had appeared
to be available NLRA protection in the areas of communication and expression
by employees.  In addition, these interpretations gave employers greater lati-
tude to maintain rules prohibiting certain types of communication and expres-
sion.  The stripping away of protection was not specific to union or nonunion
employees.  Although the IBM Corp. decision took a section 7 right from non-
union employees that union-represented employees still possess, Holling Press,
Inc. and Lutheran Heritage both narrowed protections under section 7, regard-
less of union representation.  Moreover, the Board in those decisions inter-
preted section 7 of the NLRA restrictively to facilitate employers’ efforts to
avoid liability under employment discrimination laws.  I found these decisions
and the trend of the Board particularly disappointing because with the Board’s
decision in Epilepsy Foundation I had envisioned a future for the NLRA in
which the Act became increasingly relevant to and protective of nonunion
employees, and thus increasingly relevant in a nation with declining union den-
sity.  As the Board narrowed its interpretation of section 7, however, the protec-
tions were receding for both union and nonunion employees, and the NLRA
was becoming increasingly irrelevant.  Equally troubling was the fact that the
Board was willing to narrow the protections of the NLRA in order to help
employers avoid liability under other employment laws.  If the Board, the
64 Id. at 646.
65 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
66 Id. at 825 (footnote omitted).
67 Albertson’s, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 254, 259 (2007) (quoting Lutheran Heritage, 343
N.L.R.B. at 647).
68 See infra text accompanying notes 211-12.
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agency charged with interpretation and enforcement of the Act, would not
interpret the NLRA broadly and elevate it above other laws, who would be left
to promote the NLRA and prevent its slide into obsolescence and
irrelevance?69
I was not alone in my views regarding the Board’s narrowing of the
NLRA.  The complaint filed by the AFL-CIO with the ILO Committee on Free-
dom of Association was more far-reaching in its criticism of Board decisions
than my article on the narrowing of the NLRA.70  The complaint did, however,
criticize all three of the Board decisions that I discussed, IBM Corp., Holling
Press, and Lutheran Heritage.71  The AFL-CIO quoted Professor St. Antoine
for the proposition that the Board has been “‘resolving the doubts in borderline
cases in the wrong direction,’” and that eventually these decisions would leave
the NLRA “‘badly chewed’” if not “‘eviscerated.’”72  The complaint empha-
sized that the Board’s sixty-one decisions issued in September 2007 were tanta-
mount to “an onslaught against workers’ rights under the Act.”73  Among those
decisions was Dana Corp.74 in which the Board varied its recognition-bar doc-
trine by creating a forty-five-day period after notice of voluntary recognition in
which a petition can be filed to challenge the union’s status.75  The complaint
concluded that the Board’s many decisions interpreting the NLRA narrowly,
removing protections, and diluting remedies demonstrate that the United States
Government has not satisfied its obligations under I.L.O. Conventions 87 and
98.76
As every observer realized, however, the Board’s important decision on
employees’ use of technology to communicate was still to come.  Until the
Board rendered its decision in Register-Guard, I could still cling to the hope of
Timekeeping Systems77 that the Board would find section 7 protection of
employees’ use of employers’ e-mail systems for section 7 purposes.  Most of
the hope that I had for NLRA protection had been eclipsed by Board decisions,
but employees’ use of technology to communicate and express their views was
still viable.
II. REGISTER-GUARD:  THE BOARD CONTINUES TO NARROW THE NLRA
A. The Importance of NLRA Protection for Employee Use of the Internet
and E-Mail
The importance of the Internet to the NLRA has been obvious for many
years.  Section 7 of the NLRA sets forth the fundamental rights under the Act:
employees can self organize and join labor organizations, bargain collectively
69 See Corbett, supra note 60, at 47.
70 See Complaint, supra note 21.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 10 (quoting Theodore J. St. Antoine, After 70 Years of the NLRB:  Warm Congratu-
lations—and a Few Reservations, L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Fall 2005, at 98, 101).
73 Id. at 39.
74 Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).
75 Id. at 434.
76 Complaint, supra note 21, at 41.
77 Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997).
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through representatives of their choosing, engage in other concerted activities
for mutual aid or protection, and refrain from any of the foregoing.78  In order
for any of these rights to be effectuated, employees and unions must have the
means to communicate effectively.  Without adequate means of communica-
tion, employees simply cannot learn of their rights, assess their options, and
make informed decisions about exercise or nonexercise of their section 7 rights.
The Board and the Supreme Court have decided many cases dealing with issues
of communication.  In those cases, the Board and the Court have balanced the
rights of employees and unions under section 7 of the NLRA against the rights
of employers—managerial prerogative to run the business and property rights.
Important issues in those cases have been the following: who was communicat-
ing (employee or nonemployee);79 where they were communicating (working
area or nonworking area);80 when they were communicating (during working
time or not);81 and how they were communicating (by distributing material or
orally).82  In all cases, however, the Court understood that communication
among employees and unions in the workplace is essential to section 7 rights.83
The Court stated this forcefully in Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB:  “[W]e have long
accepted the Board’s view that the right of employees to self-organize and bar-
gain collectively established by § 7 of the NLRA, . . . necessarily encompasses
the right effectively to communicate with one another regarding self-organiza-
tion at the jobsite.”84
The importance of the Internet and e-mail to communication, and thus to
the NLRA has long been obvious.85  One of the most obvious and first issues to
be raised was unions’ and employees’ use of e-mail to instigate and promote
union-organizing campaigns.86  As e-mail and Internet usage by employees and
unions increased exponentially for union organizing and other purposes,87
employers began developing computer use policies restricting types of uses.88
78 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
79 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
80 Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 485-86 (1978).
81 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795 (1945).
82 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1962).
83 Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 532; Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 485-86; Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 113; Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 795; Stoddard-Quirk Mfg.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615.
84 Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 491.
85 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 11, passim; Susan S. Robfogel, Electronic Communication
and the NLRA:  Union Access and Employer Rights, 16 LAB. LAW. 231 (2000).
86 See Hirsch, supra note 11, at 274-78; Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The
National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace:  Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces,
49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of Employees and Union
Access to Employees:  Cyber Organizing, 16 LAB. LAW. 253 (2000).
87 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1125 n.7 (2007) (Liebman &
Walsh, Members, dissenting in part) (citing AM. MGMT ASS’N, 2004 WORKPLACE E-MAIL
AND INSTANT MESSAGING SURVEY (2004)).
88 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:  COMPUTER-USE MONI-
TORING PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF SELECTED COMPANIES, GAO-02-717, at 9-13 (2002);
see also Louis J. Papa & Stuart L. Bass, How Employers Can Protect Themselves From
Liability for Employees’ Misuse of Computer, Internet, and E-Mail Systems in the Work-
place, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 110, 124 (2004) (“To limit their liability, the employer
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The Board’s need to address what constitutes permissible restrictions on use of
e-mail systems became clear, and some commentators predicted that the Board
might apply its existing rules regarding either solicitation or distribution.89
Others argued that Internet communications did not fit well within either cate-
gory and the Board would do well to create a new rule specifically designed for
such communications.90  The importance of the Board’s decisions on Internet
and e-mail issues was described by Professor Jeffrey Hirsch as holding both the
threat of “killing” the NLRA (by which he meant consigning it to utter obsoles-
cence and irrelevance) and the hope of reviving it as a force in United States
labor and employment law.91
As important as NLRA protection of Internet and e-mail usage was to
unions and union-represented employees, it also was important to unrepre-
sented employees.  Employees who have used the Internet and e-mail to com-
municate their complaints about work and related matters and have faced their
employers’ wrath have found few protections in federal or state employment
law.  Public employees may be able to make claims for violation of their first or
fourth amendment rights under the federal Constitution and comparable provi-
sions in state constitutions,92 but private sector employees do not have even
those protections.  The most promising-looking federal statute for such protec-
tion seemed to be the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 198693
amendments (“ECPA”) to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (“Federal Wiretap Act”).94  The ECPA added protection for “electronic
communications” to the Federal Wiretap Act’s protection of “wire and oral
communications.”95  Title II of the ECPA, the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”)96 provided protection for wire or electronic communication while it is
in electronic storage.97  However, the ECPA and SCA have not been inter-
preted as providing protection of employees’ use of e-mail and the Internet in
should adopt strict and defensive Internet and computer use policies and procedures that
prohibit illegal and wrongful computer and online conduct.”).
89 Hirsch, supra note 11, at 290-91.
90 Id. at 291.
91 Id. passim.
92 There have been few such claims to date, but they are available to public employees.  The
First Amendment protects public employees’ right to free speech. See, e.g., Wernsing v.
Thompson, 423 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005) (unsuccessful first amendment retaliation claim);
see also Tracie Watson & Elisabeth Piro, Note, Bloggers Beware:  A Cautionary Tale of
Blogging and the Doctrine of At-Will Employment, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 333, 340-
42 (2007) (discussing First Amendment protection of public employees).  The Fourth
Amendment protects them against unreasonable search and seizure. See Quon v. Arch Wire-
less Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008) (employee asserting successful fourth
amendment claim based on employer’s accessing and reading text messages sent on
employer’s pager).
93 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
94 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
95 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2522 (2006).
96 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2006).
97 Id. § 2701(a)(2).
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most cases.98  As the Ninth Circuit explained in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc.:
[T]he existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of commu-
nication like [plaintiff’s] secure website.  Courts have struggled to analyze problems
involving modern technology within the confines of this statutory framework, often
with unsatisfying results. . . . [U]ntil Congress brings the laws in line with modern
technology, protection of the Internet and websites such as [plaintiff’s] will remain a
confusing and uncertain area of the law.99
Despite courts’ recognition that the ECPA/SCA statutory scheme does not
adequately address employers’ monitoring and inspection of employee Internet
use and e-mail communications, Congress has not passed legislation to address
the issue.100
Turning to state common law, invasion of privacy claims have been noto-
riously ineffectual for employees because employers routinely undermine any
expectation of privacy, a required element, with computer use policies and
other documents, policies, and statements.101  One court even denied recovery
under an invasion of privacy theory to a plaintiff when the employer expressly
assured employees that their e-mails were private.102
The dearth of protection for electronic communication under federal legis-
lation, state legislation, and state common law tort theories has left the NLRA
as the best hope of employees who suffer adverse employment actions for
messages sent via e-mail or posted on the Internet.103  An interesting twist on
this point is that section 7 of the NLRA may not be just the best protection
available to employees using the Internet and e-mail, but it may preclude other
weak and limited options.  A recent case decided by the California Court of
Appeals considered the wrongful termination claim104 of an employee who was
fired after sending an e-mail message to a supervisor requesting help in a dis-
98 See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding no
violation of ECPA because no interception); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding no interception under ECPA, but reversing summary judgment for
defendant on SCA claim). But see Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th
Cir. 2008) (finding liability under the SCA).
99 Konop, 302 F.3d at 874.
100 Congress has considered bills that would have required employers to give employees
notice before engaging in computer and electronic monitoring, but those bills did not move
out of committee.  They were the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act of 1993, H.R.
1900, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993), and the Notice of Electronic Monitor-
ing Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000).  There are some state laws that require notice
before monitoring. See, e.g,, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 705 (2008).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Thorn, 375 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 2004); TBG Ins. Servs.
Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
102 Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
103 Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997); see also Nancy J. King, Labor Law
for Managers of Non-Union Employees in Traditional and Cyber Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS.
L.J. 827, 862 (2003) (“Employer policies that prohibit employees from sending e-mail to
coworkers or accessing Web sites may violate the NLRA when they restrict employees from
communicating with other employees about matters protected by [s]ection 7.”).
104 The wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims were under California
Labor Code sections 923 and 232.5.  Luke v. Collotype Labels USA, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d
440, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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pute he was having with his immediate supervisor in Luke v. Collotype Labels
USA, Inc.105  A supervisor suspended plaintiff employee for three days for
plaintiff’s alleged dishonesty about having his position covered during a
planned absence.106  Plaintiff sent an e-mail message to the company’s group
managing director in the Australia office asking him to call plaintiff.107  One
day later the company terminated plaintiff, reasoning as follows:  that he sent
an e-mail to Australia without consulting with any of the managers in the
United States, that he was soliciting signatures among his coemployees for a
letter denouncing management, that he was making his peers uncomfortable,
and that he was blatantly insubordinate.108  The court held that plaintiff’s con-
duct was covered by the NLRA and that his wrongful termination claims were
pre-empted by the NLRA.109  Although the court focused not on the sending of
the e-mail as protected conduct, but rather on the plaintiff’s discussions with
coworkers about workplace complaints and his advice to them about how to
keep records and make complaints to management, the court sent a message.
The point is that if such conduct is covered by the NLRA, it might provide not
only the best remedy, but perhaps the only remedy if tort claims are preempted.
In view of the importance of the NLRA in protecting Internet and e-mail
usage for both union and nonunion employees, much was at stake in the
Board’s decision in Register-Guard.
B. Register-Guard:  The Board Declares the Internet and E-Mail Systems
to be Just Another Chattel
1. Important and Wide-Ranging Issues Presented
The importance of Register-Guard was clear.  It was the NLRB’s opportu-
nity to address a number of issues regarding NLRA protection of e-mail and
Internet use.  The Board recognized the significance of the case when it took
the unusual step of scheduling oral argument in the case and inviting amici to
file briefs.110  In the notice and order, the Board listed questions in which it was
especially interested:
1. Do employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system (or other com-
puter-based communication systems) to communicate with other employees about
union or other concerted, protected matters?  If so, what restrictions, if any, may an
employer place on those communications?  If not, does an employer nevertheless
violate the Act if it permits non-job-related e-mails but not those related to union or
other concerted, protected matters?
2. Should the Board apply traditional rules regarding solicitation and/or distribution
to employees’ use of their employer’s e-mail system?  If so, how should those rules
be applied?  If not, what standard should be applied?
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 The e-mail had a caption “trouble brewing” and stated as follows:  “Sorry to bother you.
I usually go through my chain of command, but this will not work here at this plant.  Would
you please call me?” Id.
108 Id. at 442-43.
109 Id. at 448.
110 Notice of Oral Argument and Invitation to File Briefs, Guard Publishing Co. d/b/a The
Register-Guard, Nos. 36-CA-8743-1, -8849-1, -8789-1, -8842-1 (NLRB Jan. 10, 2007).
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3. If employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system, may an
employer nevertheless prohibit e-mail access to its employees by non-employees?  If
employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system, to what extent may an
employer monitor that use to prevent unauthorized use?
4. In answering the foregoing questions, of what relevance is the location of the
employee’s workplace?  For example, should the Board take account of whether the
employee works at home or at some location other than a facility maintained by the
employer?
5. Is employees’ use of their employer’s e-mail system a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining?  Assuming that employees have a [s]ection 7 right to use their employer’s e-
mail system, to what extent is that right waivable by their bargaining representative?
6. How common are employer policies regulating the use of employer e-mail sys-
tems?  What are the most common provisions of such policies?  Have any such poli-
cies been agreed to in collective bargaining?  If so, what are their most significant
provisions and what, if any, problems have arisen under them?
7. Are there any technological issues concerning e-mail or other computer-based
communication systems that the Board should consider in answering the foregoing
questions?111
The union subsequently filed a motion requesting that the Board delete
four questions (nonemployee access, relevance of the employee’s workplace,
policies on e-mail use issued by employers or included in collective bargaining
agreements, and technological issues regarding e-mail systems), that it argued
had nothing to do with the particular case before the Board.112  However, the
Board denied the motion.113  Thus, the Board left itself with a broad range of
issues to address, which would enable it to announce a far-reaching decision
regarding the limitations the NLRA places on employers’ restrictions of e-mail
use.
2. A Harbinger of Register-Guard: Trustees of Columbia University
The result in Register-Guard actually was presaged by a Board decision
issued in August 2007 on an e-mail issue.  In Trustees of Columbia Univer-
sity,114 the Board considered the claim of a union organizing a proposed bar-
gaining unit consisting of employees who were at sea aboard a vessel during
the time of the pre-election organizing campaign.115  The union requested e-
mail addresses of the employees, and the employer refused to provide them.116
The union filed an objection to the election, contending that the employer’s
refusal frustrated the purpose of the Board’s well-established requirement in
Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,117 that the employer must provide a list of the
names and home addresses of eligible voters within a week of an agreement or
111 Id.
112 NLRB Refuses to Delete Questions in E-Mail Case, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at
A-12 (Jan. 25, 2007).
113 Id.
114 Trs. of Columbia Univ., 350 N.L.R.B. 574 (2007).
115 According to the dissent, nine of the eleven proposed unit employees were aboard the
vessel from the day the Excelsior list was due until the day of the election. Id. at 576
(Walsh, Member, dissenting).
116 Id.
117 Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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order for an election.118  The Regional Director had concluded that, notwith-
standing the absence of any Board precedent requiring an employer to provide
e-mail addresses, under the circumstances of the case, the “manifest purpose”
of the Excelsior rule would not be satisfied if the employer were not required to
provide the e-mail addresses.119  In a two-to-one decision, the Board panel
refused to extend the Excelsior rule under the facts of the case to require the
employer to provide e-mail addresses.120  The panel majority explained that
“[p]lainly, the Board’s expertise does not encompass the rapidly expanding uni-
verse of information technology . . . .”121  The majority raised a number of
questions about the cost of sending e-mails, potential impairment of the system
by voluminous e-mails, an employer’s right not to provide a forum for third-
party expression of views on its virtual property, the relationship between
existing rules regarding union access to employer property and any new rules
that might be developed for virtual property, whether employers could continue
current e-mail monitoring without engaging in illegal surveillance, and poten-
tial invasion of employees’ privacy rights.122  The majority stated that it did not
even have the knowledge to identify other issues that probably existed, and that
the listed and unknown issues should be fully briefed before the Board departed
from “long-standing, well- understood precedent.”123
The dissent argued that the employer had not fulfilled its Excelsior duty
under the facts.  As stated in the dissent, the objective of the Excelsior rule “is
to ensure that all participants in an election have access to the electorate so that
employees can make a free and reasoned choice regarding union representa-
tion.”124  The Excelsior rule is not to be mechanically applied, and under the
facts of the case before it, the dissent argued that the employer had not substan-
tially complied with the requirement because employees had not received infor-
mation necessary to an informed exercise of their section 7 rights.125  The
dissent rejected the majority’s characterization of the union’s position as requir-
ing an extension of the Excelsior rule:  provision of e-mail addresses would be
required to comply only in the rare case, like this one, in which employees
cannot be contacted at their home addresses.126
The panel majority’s rigid adherence to the outdated Excelsior rule and its
list of concerns or issues about e-mail did not bode well for a bold and innova-
tive new treatment of e-mail in Register-Guard.
3. The Register-Guard Decision
The case involved a newspaper that had an e-mail system and a “Commu-
nications Systems Policy” (“CSP”) that provided in relevant part as follows:
118 Id. at 1239-40.
119 Columbia Univ., 350 N.L.R.B. at 575.
120 Id. at 574.
121 Id. at 576.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 577 (Walsh, Member, dissenting).
125 Id. at 578.
126 Id.
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Company communication systems and the equipment used to operate the communi-
cation system are owned and provided by the Company to assist in conducting the
business of The Register-Guard.  Communications systems are not to be used to
solicit or proselytize for commercial ventures, religious or political causes, outside
organizations, or other non-job-related solicitations.127
Notwithstanding the policy, the employer was aware that employees used
the e-mail system for various nonwork-related purposes, such as baby
announcements, party invitations, offers of athletic event tickets, etc.128
The controversy arose when an employee who was the union president
sent three e-mail messages regarding union matters.129  The events leading up
to the union president’s emails involved a union rally.130  The managing editor
sent an e-mail message to all employees regarding a planned upcoming union
rally.131  The message informed employees that they might want to leave work
early the day of the rally because police had warned the employer that anar-
chists might attend the rally.132  An employee responded with an e-mail that
suggested that the managing editor either mistakenly provided inaccurate infor-
mation about the rally or lied to employees.133  After the rally, the union presi-
dent informed the managing editor that she wanted to send an e-mail to
employees to “set the record straight.”134  The managing editor asked her to
wait until he talked with the human resources director about it.135  When she
did not receive a response within two days, the union president told the manag-
ing editor that she was going to send the e-mail, and he said he understood.136
She composed the message during her break and sent it from her work com-
puter.137  She was then told that she should not have used company equipment
to send the message, and the employer issued a written warning to her.138  She
was later issued written warnings for two more e-mail messages she sent from a
noncompany computer over the company’s e-mail system.139  The first was a
message encouraging employees to wear green to support the union’s negotiat-
ing position and the second was a request to employees to assist with the
union’s entry in a town parade.140  She sent each of these messages from a
computer in the union’s office.141  Thus, the union president was written up for
three violations of the employer’s CSP for sending nonjob-related solicitations
over the company’s e-mail system.
Later that year, during bargaining, the company proposed a clause in the
collective bargaining agreement stating that the electronic communications sys-












139 Id. at 1112.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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tem was the employer’s property and prohibited its use for union business.142
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the company vio-
lated section 8(a)(1) by promulgating, maintaining and enforcing an overly
broad rule prohibiting e-mail use, section 8(a)(1) by discriminatorily enforcing
that rule, and section 8(a)(5) by insisting on an illegal provision during bargain-
ing.143  The administrative law judge found that maintenance of the rule was
not a violation of section 8(a)(1), but he found that the employer did violate
8(a)(1) by discriminatorily enforcing the rule by permitting some nonwork-
related uses and punishing the union-related uses.144  Thus, the stage was set
for the Board to decide what section 7 of the NLRA has to say about employ-
ees’ rights to use employers’ e-mail systems.
In what had become a customary and predictable split, the Board held in a
three-to-two decision that promulgating, maintaining, and enforcing such a rule
does not violate section 8(a)(1), and thus insisting on it in bargaining does not
violate section 8(a)(5).145  The Board majority held that the issue of employees’
right to use an employer’s e-mail system is resolved by the well-established
principle that “absent discrimination, employees have no statutory right to use
an employer’s equipment or media for section 7 communications.”146  Then the
majority went on to reject the current standard for evaluating discriminatory
enforcement (which would not have permitted prohibition for union purposes if
other nonwork- related uses were permitted) and replaced it with a new stan-
dard that finds discrimination only when an employer prohibits union solicita-
tions or messages, but permits nonunion solicitations or messages of a similar
kind.147
i. Majority Opinion
The majority rejected the arguments of the General Counsel, the charging
party, the AFL-CIO, and amici that under Republic Aviation, the employer’s
CSP was presumptively invalid because it did not distinguish between working
and nonworking time.148  Instead, the majority pigeonholed the case with
Board decisions holding that employers have a property right to regulate and
restrict use of their personal property.149  Thus, the majority analogized the e-
mail system to chattels (personal property) such as televisions, bulletin boards,
copy machines, telephones, and public address systems.150  Rejecting Republic
Aviation as controlling authority, the Board majority distinguished it because
the communications policy at issue dealt with electronic communications, not
face-to-face solicitation, with which Republic Aviation was concerned.151
Emphasizing its focus on property rights over communication rights, the major-
142 Id.
143 The allegations and analysis of section 8(a)(3) violations are omitted from discussion
here.
144 Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1112.
145 Id. at 1110.
146 Id. at 1116.
147 Id. at 1118.
148 Id. at 1113, 1114-16.
149 Id. at 1114-16.
150 Id. at 1114 (citing Board decisions).
151 Id. at 1115.
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ity explained that “‘[s]ection 7 of the Act protects organizational rights . . .
rather than particular means by which employees may seek to communi-
cate.’”152  Although the majority conceded that e-mail has radically changed
how people communicate, it reasoned that telephones similarly changed com-
munications, but the Board has not found a general section 7 right for employ-
ees to use their employers’ telephone systems.153
Still, even after announcing that the employer could promulgate and main-
tain the rule, the majority was left with a case in which, even if there were no
section 8(a)(1) violation for having such a rule, there would be a section 8(a)(1)
violation for discriminatory enforcement under the prevailing standard articu-
lated by the Board in Fleming Co.:  “‘[i]f an employer allows employees to use
its communications equipment for nonwork related purposes, it may not validly
prohibit employee use of communications equipment for [s]ection 7 pur-
poses.’”154  The majority then embarked on an explanation of the meaning of
discrimination (“unequal treatment of equals”), and based on that, adopted the
discrimination standard developed by the Seventh Circuit:  “disparate treatment
of activities or communications of a similar character because of their union or
other [s]ection 7-protected status.”155  Under this new discriminatory enforce-
ment standard, the majority found that the reprimand for the e-mail sent to
provide clarifying information about the union rally was a violation of section
8(a)(1) because it was not a solicitation.156  The employer’s policy prohibited
“non-job-related solicitations,” and the employer permitted nonjob-related
communications that were not solicitations.157  The only difference between the
personal e-mails that were permitted and those that were sent by the union
president was the union aspect of the latter.158  Therefore, under the new dispa-
rate-treatment-of-equals standard, reprimanding the union president for the
informational e-mail was discriminatory.159  In contrast, the other two e-mails
were solicitations to take actions to support a group or organization—the
union.160  Because there was no evidence that the employer had permitted
solicitations to support other groups or organizations, the Board majority held
that reprimanding the union president for those two e-mails was not discrimina-
tory enforcement in violation of section 8(a)(1).161
152 Id. (quoting Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1995)).
153 Id. at 1116.
154 Id. at 1117 (citing Fleming Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 192, 194 (2001), enforcement denied, 349
F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2003)).
155 Id. at 1118.  Curiously, the Seventh Circuit appears not to apply this standard consist-
ently.  For example, in a recent decision, the court rejected the argument that an employer
could prohibit union solicitations when it permitted other types of solicitations in patient care
areas. See St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs. v. NLRB, 519 F.3d 373, 375-76 (7th Cir.
2008).  Responding to the argument that some of the permitted solicitations were charitable
or social rather than commercial, the court wrote, “[W]hat difference can that make?” Id. at
375.
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ii. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent criticized the majority opinion on a number of grounds.  The
most general was the “Rip Van Winkle” ground that the majority is not fulfil-
ling the Board’s duty of interpreting the NLRA in light of “changing patterns of
industrial life.”162  Turning to specific criticisms, the dissent would have found
the CSP to be a section 8(a)(1) violation under Republic Aviation.163  The dis-
sent rejected the personal property cases as controlling, explaining that it was
“absurd” to analogize e-mail to chattels such as telephones, televisions, or bul-
letin boards:  “[A]n e-mail system and the messages traveling through it are not
simply ‘equipment’; the [employer] does not own cyberspace.”164
On the issue of the majority’s changing the standard for discriminatory
enforcement of a rule, the dissent criticized the majority for adopting a standard
for discriminatory enforcement under section 8(a)(1) that was designed for dis-
crimination based on motive, under the Constitution and employment discrimi-
nation statutes.165  The dissent pointed out that the NLRA differs from
antidiscrimination statutes because it does not just prohibit discrimination
based on union and other concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, but it
also protects the right to engage in such activity.166  Or, stated differently, a
section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice is not primarily about discrimination, but
about interference with section 7 rights.167  The dissent also argued that the
new standard does not protect section 7 rights because an employer can adopt
and enforce a rule that permits almost every kind of nonwork-related communi-
cation except union-related communications.168  The dissent offered the exam-
ple of a rule that prohibits nonwork-related solicitations by membership
organizations; such a rule would permit solicitations by or on behalf of many
commercial and charitable organizations, but not those by or on behalf of
unions.169  The dissent also contended that, even under the new discrimination
standard adopted by the majority, the employer violated section 8(a)(1).170
Assuming arguendo that the e-mails urging employees to wear green to support
the union’s bargaining position and to participate in the union parade entry
were solicitations, the dissent explained that some of the personal messages
permitted by the employer were personal solicitations.171  The dissent also
explained that the Seventh Circuit, in articulating the standard adopted by the
majority, noted that allowing communications for anything but unions is “‘anti-
162 Id. at 1125 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting in part).(quoting NLRB v. J. Wein-
garten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)) (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting in part).
See NLRB:  No Section 7 Right to Use Employer’s E-Mail, Lab. L. Rep. Insight (CCH) No.
960, at 1 (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Insight] (“[E]choing its now familiar criticism that the
current Board has continually shirked its responsibility to adapt the Act . . .”).
163 Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1127 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting in
part).
164 Id. at 1125-26.
165 Id. at 1129.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1130.
169 Id. at 1130 n.26.
170 Id. at 1131.
171 Id.
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union discrimination by anyone’s definition.’”172  The evidence in the case did
not demonstrate that the employer enforced its CSP against any communica-
tions other than union messages.
III. REGISTER-GUARD AND THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING NLRA
A. Critique of the Specific Holdings and Assessment of Likely
Ramifications
The long and eagerly anticipated Board decision in Register-Guard pro-
voked predictable responses:  employers praised it, and unions condemned
it.173  The first academic assessment was very critical.174  In the aftermath of
Register -Guard, employers likely will revise their computer use policies and
enforcement strategies to try to prohibit and punish union-related
communications.175
The dissent presented apt criticisms of both of the majority’s holdings:
maintaining a computer use rule that prohibits nonwork-related use and the new
standard for discriminatory enforcement.  The large-scale attack was that the
Board was failing to fulfill its role to interpret the NLRA in light of the chang-
ing workplace.  This is a criticism to which I will return after addressing the
specific criticisms.
1. Which Pigeonhole for E-Mail?  The Myriad Standards Conundrum
Who had the better argument about the controlling precedent in the com-
munication and access cases?  The dissent would have found the computer use
rule presumptively invalid under Republic Aviation rather than finding the per-
sonal property rights cases controlling, as did the majority.  The dissent’s criti-
cism that e-mail and associated cyberspace are not chattels like bulletin boards,
telephones, etc. is a sound argument.  As the dissent states, while the employer
may own the computers and the e-mail system, it does not own cyberspace.176
The different lines of controlling authority cited by the majority and dissent
also manifest the different emphases of the two sides.  Throughout the history
of the communication and access cases, the competing values have been the
communication of information to facilitate informed exercise of section 7
rights, on one side, and property rights of the employer and managerial prerog-
ative, on the other.  In Register-Guard, the majority clearly comes down on the
side of property rights of the employer: “‘Section 7 of the Act protects organi-
zational rights . . . rather than particular means by which employees may seek
172 Id. (quoting Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1995)).
173 See, e.g., Susan J. McGolrick, Board’s E-Mail Rulings Get Opposing Reviews from
Management, Union Speakers at ABA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at C-1 (Feb. 20,
2008); Insight, supra note 162 at 3.
174 See Hirsch, supra note 11, at 277-78.
175 See Barbara E. Hoey & Jessica L. Berenbroick, NLRB Ruling Allows Restrictions on
Union Use of Company E-Mail, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 20, 2008, at 24; see also Insight, supra note
162 (quoting management attorney Joseph Santucci that employers may review and revise
computer use policies that are too liberal in light of the decision).
176 See also King, supra note 103, at 869-72 (arguing for application of solicitation and
distribution rules to cyber workplaces).
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to communicate.’”177  The dissent, in contrast, recognizes the balancing of
rights and interests, but gives greater weight to the employees’ right to commu-
nicate about section 7 matters, as the dissent found little infringement on the
employer’s property interest.178  By now this is a well-worn path, and generally
speaking, property rights have been faring well ever since Lechmere v.
NLRB.179  In Lechmere, the Supreme Court recognized the right of an
employer to exclude from its real property nonemployee union organizers when
alternative means of communication exist.180  Although the Register-Guard
majority did acknowledge the employer’s argument that Lechmere should
apply when the union president sent the two e-mails from the union office in a
footnote, the majority held that Lechmere was not controlling because it
involved nonemployees and access to real property.181  Still, the Lechmere
formula, elevation of property rights over section 7 rights and the communica-
tion essential to their informed exercise, resonated in the majority opinion in
Register-Guard.182
There are two points I wish to make about this ongoing balancing, or bat-
tle for supremacy, among rights and interests in communication and access
cases.  First, the Board continues to evaluate property rights, an area in which it
has little expertise.183  Second, the Board and the Supreme Court have not clar-
ified why they continue to give employers more protection of their ownership
interest in chattels than in their real property.184  Tort law at least recognizes a
more protected ownership right in real property than personal property.185  As
the dissent in Register-Guard points out, the torts cases dealing with e-mail
systems and trespass to chattels, on which the employer relied, arguably should
have led to a different result in the majority’s analysis of personal property
rights.186
Beyond the positions of the majority and the dissent, another possibility is
that advocated by Professor Hirsch.  He argued that Register-Guard should not
have been decided by forcing e-mail communication into any of the Board’s
177 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1115 (2007) (quoting Guardian
Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1995)).
178 Id. at 1126 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting in part).
179 Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
180 Id. at 540-41.
181 Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1119 n.25.
182 See Insight, supra note 162 (quoting Jeffrey Hirsch as saying that the majority essen-
tially applied Lechmere).
183 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47
B.C. L. REV. 891 (2006).
184 Hirsch, supra note 11, at 285 (“The Board and Supreme Court have long refused to give
employers a near-absolute right to restrict employee use of their real property, and there is no
reason to give them greater power over their equipment.”).
185 For example, establishing actual damage is not a required element to prove a trespass to
real property, whereas actual damage is a required element to establish trespass to chattels.
See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 124 (2000) (“Trespass to chattels differs from
trespass to land in one important respect. . . . To establish liability for trespass to chattels, the
possessor must show legally recognizable harm.”).
186 Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1126 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting in
part).  The dissent explained that in trespass to chattels cases, plaintiffs cannot recover for
interference with their ownership interest in chattels unless they prove some actual harm. Id.
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precedents.187  Instead, the Board should re-evaluate and modify its entire anal-
ysis of employer regulation of employee communications.188  He argued for
erasing the distinction between solicitation and distribution and replacing the
old standards with a new one that employer interference with union-related
communications is presumptively invalid.189  In addition to the Internet being
different from other types of communication, another rationale that would sup-
port such a result is the Board’s breaking free from its property law shackles
and focusing on communication in the twenty-first century.  Such a focus in
Register-Guard would have been better suited to the e-mail system at issue
rather than characterizing it as a piece of personal property.  Additionally and
more significantly, a focus on communications would have grounded the
Board’s analysis in the key to effectuating section 7 rights.
I agree with Professor Hirsch that the Board needs to re-evaluate its analy-
sis of the legality of employer rules restricting employee and union communi-
cations.190  I think the overhaul of the analysis needs to be complete.  The most
salient problem on display in Register-Guard, in my view, is that the Board has
too many standards for different types of employer rules, and that surfeit of
standards is what provoked the argument about where in that grid to fit e-mail
systems.  The standards include the Republic Aviation standard for rules
regarding solicitations, the rule regarding distribution, the cases cited by the
majority for rules regarding use of an employer’s personal property, the Lech-
mere standard for nonemployee access to real property, and so on.191  The
Board’s and the Supreme Court’s creation of a grid of different standards to
evaluate the legality of employers’ rules prohibiting different types of conduct
seems both artificial and fraught with risk.  The danger is that the Board will
lose sight of the possible overlap and interactions among these different stan-
dards and permit employers too much license in regulating conduct that should
be protected under section 7.  The distinctions seem artificial because not every
communication by a particular method fits neatly into one category, as the
example of e-mail shows.
An example of overlap and interactions is the Board’s failure to mention
in Register-Guard one particularly relevant standard.  I am not sure how this
standard interacts with the rule established in Register-Guard.  Although the
majority considered and rejected the Republic Aviation standard and mentioned
the Lechmere standard, missing from the majority’s analysis of the legality of
the employer’s promulgating and maintaining the rule was any mention of the
standard articulated in Lafayette Park Hotel192 and revised in Lutheran Heri-
tage.193  Those cases establish the general standard for evaluating whether an
employer commits an unfair labor practice by maintaining a rule that could be
187 Hirsch, supra note 11, at 291-95.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 293-94.
190 Id. at 282-83.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 78-84.
192 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998), enforced, Lafayette Park Hotel v.
NLRB, 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
193 Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage), 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004).
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interpreted as prohibiting protected section 7 conduct.194  Apparently the Board
considered that standard irrelevant because the majority’s focus was not on the
communication that is prohibited, but on the prohibited means of communicat-
ing.  This analytical framework of dividing types and methods of communicat-
ing and formulating a rule for each different type and means of communication
can lead to confusion and increasing restriction of communication if one fails to
appreciate the possible interactions of the various standards.  What happens if,
in the aftermath of Register-Guard, an employer issues a broad prohibition on
employee e-mail communications?  What is the interaction of Register-Guard
and Lafayette Park/Lutheran Heritage?
2. Changing the Discrimination Standard to Give Employers the
Benefit of the E-Mail Standard
Who had the better argument regarding discriminatory enforcement of the
policy?  Ironically, the Board majority that classified the e-mail system as con-
servatively as it could (as chattels) and forced it into an existing and ill-suited
line of authority, in the same decision abrogated the firmly established Board
standard for discriminatory enforcement.  Thus, a Board that felt bound by ill-
fitting precedent on the first issue broke free from clearly controlling precedent
on the second issue.  The arguments by the majority and dissent about the
meaning of discrimination under the NLRA are interesting, but the majority
undoubtedly understood that its first holding providing that prohibitory rules
are permissible would have little practical and operational significance under
the then-existing discrimination standard.  Employers would have great diffi-
culty uniformly monitoring and enforcing rules that prohibited all nonwork
uses of computers or systems, or even as in Register-Guard, all nonwork-
related solicitations.  Thus, for employers to realize any benefit from the first
holding, the discrimination standard had to be changed.  The dissent suggests
that what the majority did was create a standard under which employers could
permit almost any communication and still prohibit union communications as
long as the rule does not expressly refer to union communications.195  The dis-
sent makes a good point that the majority’s holding allows employers to coordi-
nate drafting their rules and enforcement so as to permit a great deal of
communication but prohibit section 7 communications.  Indeed, the majority’s
standard can be understood as pragmatic and functional, permitting employers
to promulgate and maintain prohibitory rules and granting them some leeway in
enforcement.  The result is that employers are being advised to evaluate and
perhaps redraft their rules as well as to evaluate and perhaps revamp their
enforcement strategies.  For example, a couple of commentators offering advice
in light of Register-Guard, state that the decision “offers all employers a valua-
ble opportunity to gain control of their e-mail systems.”196  They recommend
that employers review and reissue their policies, train employees on permitted
194 See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
195 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1130 (2007) (Liebman &
Walsh, Members, dissenting in part).
196 See, e.g., Hoey & Berenbroick, supra note 175; see also Insight, supra note 162, at 3
(quoting management attorney Joseph Santucci).
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e-mail usage, and finally enforce the policies through random monitoring and
discipline for violations.197
In sum, then, the Board majority fit e-mail within the existing line of
authority that completely subordinated section 7 rights and the communication
needed to effectuate those rights to employers’ property rights.  Apparently rec-
ognizing that employers would not be able to satisfy the existing discriminatory
enforcement standard, the Board majority revised it so that employers could
draft rules and coordinate monitoring and enforcement in a way that will satisfy
the new standard.  This result very likely will invigorate employers to promul-
gate prohibitory rules and redouble their enforcement efforts.
B. Critique of Register-Guard in the Big Picture:  The Board and the Place
of the NLRA in United States Labor and Employment Law
Beyond assessing the holdings of the Board in light of options on control-
ling authority and incentives created, I turn now to the implications of the deci-
sion for the roles of the NLRB and the NLRA in the whole of United States
labor and employment law.
First, the Board is depicted by the dissent, Professor Hirsch,198 and others
as being stuck in a past age and consequently deciding cases in ways that make
the NLRA increasingly anachronistic.  Indeed, the Board majority in Register-
Guard sounded scarcely more prepared and competent than the timid panel in
Trustees of Columbia University that proclaimed its lack of expertise in infor-
mation technology and declared that it would need help from full briefing of
known and unknown issues.199  The Board certainly got briefing assistance in
Register-Guard, yet it backed away from most of the questions in which it
indicated an interest when it granted oral argument and invited amicus
briefs.200
I am not so much concerned that the Board did not address all of the
questions that it suggested it might in Register-Guard.  Indeed, given the result,
I prefer that it deferred addressing some questions.  I am disappointed, how-
ever, that the Board still does not value communication as a matter of transcen-
dent importance under the NLRA and the Internet and e-mail as the
revolutionary means of communication that they are.  My view expressed in
my 2002 article, that because the heart of the NLRA is communication and
expression, computers and technology present a hope for the Act to become
more relevant than at any time since its passage,201 is teetering on the brink.
Professor Hirsch has predicted that the Internet will save or bury the Board and
the NLRA, and that was before Register-Guard.202  If he and I are correct
197 Hoey & Berenbroick, supra note 175.
198 Hirsch, supra note 11, at 268 (stating that the Board majority’s “precedents frequently
appear to be stuck in a bygone era” and “[t]his intransigence threatens to decrease the rele-
vance of the NLRA to the point that it would cease to have more than a marginal impact on
the labor landscape”).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 114-26.
200 Hirsch, supra note 11, at 278 (“Even more disturbing than the Board’s analysis in this
case, was its failure to address many of the issues it had raised.”) (footnote omitted).
201 Corbett, supra note 43, at 287.
202 Hirsch, supra note 11, at 303.
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about the importance of the Board’s treatment of e-mail and the Internet, the
Board majority took a big step toward pushing the NLRA into the grave.
More important than the Board’s being stuck in an archaic mode of analy-
sis and a bygone era is the concern permeating the AFL-CIO complaint to the
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association that the Board is consistently
deciding issues in ways that disfavor employees and unions and their rights
under the NLRA and favor employers and their rights from whatever sources;
the Board is subordinating the NLRA and the rights embodied therein to other
laws and the rights it finds therein (although its expertise in identifying rights in
such laws is questionable).  I asked in 2006:  if the Board does not elevate the
Act and the rights and values it embodies over other laws, who will?203 Regis-
ter-Guard represents the Board’s continued narrowing of the protections of the
NLRA for employees in the areas of expression and technology, employer
rules, and employees speaking out against employers.  These are areas in which
it looked eight years ago as if the Board might expand protections.
I posited in 2002, after Epilepsy Foundation, that the Board would con-
tinue to interpret the NLRA in ways that made it more protective of nonunion
employees.  In so doing, the Board would make the Act more relevant in the
overall body of United States labor and employment law.  This latter conclu-
sion would be true for at least two reasons.  First, of course, the overwhelming
part of the United States workforce is nonunionized.  Second, there are issues
of growing concern in United States workplaces that either are not addressed or
are poorly addressed by other sources of employment law.204  Some of the
most salient examples are private sector employees’ concerns and claims for
freedom of expression, invasion of privacy, and computer monitoring.  Rather
than interpreting the NLRA expansively to cover union and nonunion employ-
ees alike in these important areas and thus expand the role and importance of
the NLRA, the Board has interpreted the Act narrowly and decreased its
importance.
To illustrate, Timekeeping Systems, Inc.205 is a Board decision used in
employment law casebooks to demonstrate that nonunion employees may have
a claim when they disseminate complaints to coemployees about working con-
ditions.206  The employee sent an e-mail message response after his boss sent
an e-mail explaining a new vacation plan.207  The responsive e-mail, which
criticized the boss’ plan in disparaging terms, resulted in the employee’s termi-
nation.208  I am concerned that Register-Guard may affect the outcome of cases
like Timekeeping Systems, in which employees send e-mails to coemployees
critical of supervisors and/or employer terms and conditions.  The obvious
response is that Register-Guard would not change the result in Timekeeping
203 Corbett, supra note 60, at 47.
204 See supra notes 92-103.
205 Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997). See supra text accompanying notes
46-52.
206 See, e.g., MARION G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORKLAW:  CASES
AND MATERIALS 500 (2005); STEVEN L. WILLBORN, STEWART J. SCHWAB, JOHN F. BURTON,
JR. & GILLIAN L.L. LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 231 (4th ed. 2007).
207 Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. at 245-46.
208 Id. at 247.
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Systems because the e-mail in Timekeeping Systems dealt with work-related
matters.  Fair enough, but I think the response is too facile.  At least three con-
siderations leave me uncertain.  First, the Board majority stated that employees
have no section 7 right to use their employer’s e-mail system for section 7
purposes.209  Second, each case will involve a consideration of what the
employer’s rule says and how the employee communication is classified (work-
related or nonwork-related, and solicitation or nonsolicitation) in the particular
case.  What is work-related and what constitutes a solicitation is not so clear.210
Third, the result might be clearer if the Board had discussed in Register-Guard
the interaction of its rule regarding e-mail use with the Lafayette Park Hotel/
Lutheran Heritage standard for evaluating the validity of employer rules.211
What if an employer maintained a rule that prohibited use of its computers and
e-mail system to criticize or say offensive things about supervisors or work-
place conditions?  Although this may seem clearly impermissible, the Board in
Lutheran Heritage reinterpreted the Lafayette Park standard to uphold
employer rules prohibiting “abusive or threatening language.”212  The Board’s
modification of the Lafayette Park standard and the failure of the Board to
explain the interaction of the Register-Guard standard and the Lutheran Heri-
tage standard leaves me uncertain about the result in a case like Timekeeping
Systems.  If we say that Timekeeping Systems would be decided the same after
Register-Guard because the messages in Register-Guard dealt with union
activity, and the message in Timekeeping Systems dealt with nonunion work-
related criticism, we are configuring a state of the law in which section 7 pro-
tects union-related activity less than nonunion work-related activity.  That con-
figuration is contrary to the purposes of the NLRA.  The contours of Register-
Guard will have to be worked out, if it is not overruled.  Regardless, the deci-
sion continued the Board’s trend of choosing not to interpret the NLRA in ways
that could fill gaps in protection in United States labor and employment law.
Beyond not expanding the NLRA to fill gaps, Register-Guard probably
has exacerbated the problems faced by employees in those legal gaps by creat-
ing incentives for employers to be active in unprotected areas.  As mentioned
above, the advice that employers have been receiving under pre-Register-
Guard law was to issue computer use policies that prohibit uses and undermine
expectations of privacy, to randomly monitor e-mail and Internet use, and to
discipline employees for violations.213  After Register-Guard this kind of
employer action is likely to increase.214  Rather than turning to the NLRA for
vindication of their rights when torts and other federal statues such as the
ECPA fail them, employees may find that the Board’s interpretation of the
NLRA itself created a new incentive for employers to act.
Finally, as employers review, promulgate and enforce rules prohibiting e-
mail and Internet use pursuant to Register-Guard, employees and employers
209 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1110 (2007).
210 See, e.g., id. at 1125 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
211 For discussion of this standard and its absence from the Register Guard decision, see
supra text accompanying notes 63-68 & 192-94.
212 Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage), 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004).
213 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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are likely to be confused about what the law permits.215  So far, in the early
post-Register-Guard cases, discriminatory enforcement of rules still presents a
problem for employers.216  This is a state of the law that creates fear and reluc-
tance regarding communication, a state that is wholly inconsistent with the
rights contained in section 7—rights which depend on communication for their
realization.
A petition for review of the Board’s decision in Register-Guard is pending
in the D.C. Circuit.217  The court of appeal may reverse the Board.218  Still, for
the NLRA to reach a turning point, the Board must begin to interpret the Act
expansively and view the Act as having a key role in United States labor and
employment law.
CONCLUSION
For those who hold out hope for the reinvigoration of the NLRA as a force
in United States labor and employment law, Register-Guard was a bad decision
in a bad year.  As the AFL-CIO in its complaint to the ILO and others have
recognized, however, Register-Guard is just the latest Board decision in many
over a period of years interpreting the NLRA restrictively and adversely to
unions and employees.  As the Board sat in what was a rather uneventful two-
member state throughout 2008, however, there was hope that we have reached
a turning point.  The NLRA still has the potential to be interpreted in a way that
makes it a major source of protection for employee communication and expres-
sion, both for represented and unrepresented employees.  To facilitate that shift,
Register-Guard should be overruled, and the Board should undertake a com-
prehensive review and restatement of the law regarding access and communica-
tion.  This big project requires a Board, however, that wants to make the NLRA
a vital part of United States labor and employment law in the twenty-first cen-
tury.  We shall see what fate awaits the NLRA when Rip Van Winkle awakes.
215 See Insight, supra note 162, at 3-4 (Barbara Camens, attorney of record for the union in
Register-Guard, warning of traps for employers and a “twilight zone” for employees).
216 The General Counsel has directed all Regional Offices to submit discrimination cases to
the Division of Advice for decision to try to ensure consistency in application of the new
law. See Memorandum GC 08-07 from Ronald Meisburg, General Counsel, to All Division
Heads, Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (May 15, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/GC%20Memo/2008/GC%2008-07%20Report%20
on%20Case%20Development.pdf.  In the first five cases reported on by the General Coun-
sel, discriminatory enforcement was found in four. Id. at 3, 5, 7, 10.
217 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), appeal docketed, No.
08-1013 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 4, 2008).
218 See Lawrence E. Dube, Law Professors Speaking at ABA Conference Criticize NLRB’s
Register-Guard Decision, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 87, at C-1 (May 6, 2008) (reporting
that Professor Hirsch predicts that the court of appeals will hold that Register-Guard is
inconsistent with Republic Aviation).
